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1 Introduction
During the history of mankind, children have been natural candidates to provide old-
age support for their parents. While such informal intra-family transfers have been
replaced by formal pension schemes in industrialized economies, many developing
and emerging economies still face the challenge of expanding coverage and generosity.
Yet, how does the introduction and enhancement of public pension systems affect
demography? In theoretical work, the introduction of formal old-age pensions has
been associated with declining fertility rates—a link that can be rationalized by the
old-age security hypothesis of fertility. Macro data seem to support the postulated
trade-off between old-age pensions and the number of children per woman. Yet, there
is almost no micro-economic evidence on the causal behavioral fertility responses to
the introduction or expansion of pension systems.
This paper provides the first comprehensive evidence on the effect of introducing
old-age pensions on the fertility behavior of women.1 We test whether women in
fertile age—who face an unanticipated, exogenous and substantial increase in public
pension wealth—reduce their number of offsprings that might have otherwise served
as informal old-age providers within the family. Our study is based on a quasi-
experiment in Brazil, where pension eligibility rules, coverage and benefit levels were
completely equalized between urban and rural workers in 1991. Rural and informal
sector workers became suddenly eligible for generous and publicly provided old-age
pensions—especially rural women, who had effectively been barred from the pension
system.
Our first contribution is the careful identification of the causal effect of expanding
old-age pensions on the fertility of women aged 15-44 using a large nationally repre-
sentative data set spanning the period 1981 to 2014. Our analysis is based on an event
study (ES) approach for the long-run and a difference-in-differences (DID) framework
for the short-run assessment. Therefore, we exploit variation over time (pre vs. post
reform) as well as variation across groups: female rural workers were strongly affected
by the pension reform (treatment group), while their urban counterparts experienced
almost no increase in pension wealth (control group). We complement this analysis
with an instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimate the semi-elasticity of fertility
with respect to pension wealth. A comprehensive assessment of alternative explana-
tions and potential confounders, such as changes in education, child mortality, culture,
etc., bolsters our identifying assumptions.
1Empirical studies have analyzed the effect of similar pension policies in Brazil, South Africa
and Ukraine on labor supply decisions or the nutritional status of children (Duflo, 2003; De Car-
valho Filho, 2008; Danzer, 2013).
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As a second contribution, we study the heterogeneity of fertility responses with
respect to women’s age as well as the number and gender of previously born children.
We expect older women, i.e., those towards the end of their fertility cycle, to respond
stronger to the pension reform for five theoretical reasons: (1) they have on average
older children, making their survival and, hence, their ability to provide old-age sup-
port more likely; (2) they therefore also tend to have better information about the
ability of their children as future care-takers; (3) they are closer to the saturation level
of fertility, prompting a more immediate fertility response; (4) they gain more in terms
of pension wealth given the shorter discounting period; and (5) they are more aware
and care more about reforms that will become relevant in the relatively near future.
Consequently, fertility effects should be most strongly felt at higher birth parities.
Regarding the sex of previously born children, we expect that women who already
have a son in the family respond differently from women who have only daughters
because of Brazil’s inheritance tradition favoring sons.
We find that the rise in pension wealth has a disincentive effect on women’s total
number of births in the long-run and on the childbearing probability in the short-run.
Our estimates show, first, that the pension reform reduced completed fertility at age
45 by on average 1.3 within the first 20 years after its implementation. Second, the
annualized probability of childbirth falls by about 1.2 percentage points briefly after
the reform, corresponding to a 10% decrease. The entire effect of the pension reform is
concentrated among women in the middle and late phases of their fertility cycle (aged
30-44) whose childbearing probability declines by about 2.5 percentage points (a 25%
decrease); the results for women aged 15-29 are insignificant. The fertility response
is strongest at higher birth parities and among mothers with sons. A simple back-
of-the-envelope calculation illustrates how these fertility responses have eroded the
contribution base of the Brazilian PAYG system and, hence, introduced a structural
deficit.
Historically, fertility declined at about the time when many high- and middle-
income countries introduced or expanded their social security systems (Ehrlich and
Kim, 2007; Schwarz, 2014). Although economic theory suggests that public old-age
pensions affect individual’s reproductive behavior and are a contributing cause to
the fertility decline observed in modern economies, testing this link and estimating its
size and significance has proven difficult, particularly at the micro-level. Most existing
studies provide evidence based on theoretical OLG models; these studies use cross-
country variation in aggregated time-series data to estimate the correlation between
governmental public pension spending (or coverage rates) and various fertility mea-
sures (Hohm, 1975; Ehrlich and Zhong, 1998; Ehrlich and Kim, 2007; Boldrin et al.,
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2015). Other studies estimate the correlation between the generosity of public pension
spending and fertility rates for single countries (e.g. Swidler (1983) for the US; Cigno
and Rosati (1996) for Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US; Fenge and Scheubel (2017)
for Germany). These papers suggest that the generosity of public old-age pensions
and fertility (or population growth) are negatively correlated. Quasi-experiments are
rare: Billary and Galasso (2009) use survey data on two quasi-experimental policy
changes in Italy in 1992 and 1995 and compare households with worsening pension
outlook and those unaffected by the reform. Their results suggest that less generous
pensions increase fertility, even in industrialized economies. Surprisingly, there is little
evidence on the link between old-age pensions on fertility in low- and middle-income
countries where the trade-off should be especially pronounced given the reliance on
informal intra-family arrangements for old-age provision. An exception is Nugent and
Gillaspy (1983) who use Mexican census data and estimate a negative correlation be-
tween changes in the child-to-women ratio and the population share covered by social
security at the municipio (county) level between 1960 and 1970.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
background. Section 3 provides details on the Brazilian pension system and the
reform of 1991 which we exploit as quasi-experiment. Section 4 describes the data
of our empirical analysis, Section 5 the identification strategy. Section 6 presents the
results. Section 7 discusses several robustness exercises. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In caring about their economic well-being at old-age, individuals can secure sufficient
and reliable provision through savings, a functioning pension system or transfers from
children (Galasso et al., 2009). The so-called old-age security hypothesis of fertility
(Leibenstein, 1957) implicitly posits the trade-off between children and other forms of
pension savings: it postulates that parents not only procreate for the joy of parenthood
(as proposed by Becker et al., 1990) but also to secure economic support from their
offsprings at old-age.2 In developing countries, widespread poverty and a lack of
savings instruments imply that parents need to rely on fertility or on the public
pension system (Leibenstein, 1957, 1975; Nugent, 1985). Accordingly, missing or
incomplete pension institutions are associated with higher fertility rates (Boldrin and
Jones, 2002; Galasso et al., 2009; Boldrin et al., 2015). The introduction of formal
2Empirical tests of the old-age security motive can be found in e.g. Neher (1971); Hohm (1975);
Cain (1981, 1984); Jensen (1990); Hoddinott (1992); Cai et al. (2006) and Oliveira (2016). Indirect
evidence shows that public transfers crowd out private transfers (Jensen, 2004; Amuedo-Dorantes
and Juarez, 2015).
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pension systems will, all else equal, exogenously increase the expected old-age pension
wealth of individuals. This will in turn lower the need to rely on informal intra-family
contracts for old-age provision and, hence, reduce fertility in the long-run. Theoretical
considerations suggest, however, that the immediacy and magnitude of this fertility
response differ along three dimensions: the age of the woman as well as the number
and the gender of previously born children.
2.1 Age of the Woman
One crucial determinant of the response is the age of the woman, reflecting different
phases of her fertility cycle.
First, there is a positive relationship between a woman’s age and the precision
with which she can target her desired fertility level. At the time of the exogenous
pension reform older women tend to have on average more and older children than
younger women. Since child mortality is most prevalent in the first five years after
birth, older women face lower risks to their children’s survival (survival effect).
Second, older parents tend to have older children and, hence, a richer set of in-
formation about their physical, mental and health constitution. They know their
children’s gender, ability, and attitudes. For these reasons, older women are less
likely to hoard children, which lowers overall fertility (information effect).
Third, an immediate fertility response will be expected among women who have
already achieved or are close to achieving their desired lower fertility (given the new
pension wealth level), i.e., among those in the middle or late phase of their fertility
cycle. Moreover, since conception cannot be perfectly controlled, older women have
a shorter remaining at-risk period, which will reduce the expected number of unde-
sired pregnancies and, hence, increase the certainty about the number of children
(saturation effect).
Fourth, the fertility response depends on the magnitude of the pension wealth
effect, i.e., how strongly the present value of future old-age pension benefits changes
as a consequence of the reform. A stronger wealth increase is expected to decrease
fertility more strongly. Since older women are closer to retirement age, they discount
future benefit streams over shorter periods of time, leading to an overall larger pension
wealth (pension wealth effect).
Fifth, behavioral responses to the pension reform are more likely when its conse-
quences are more salient which can be expected for individuals closer to retirement
age (salience effect).
Taken together, the survival, information, saturation, pension wealth and salience
effects suggest that older women respond stronger to an increase in the generosity
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of the pension system in the short-run. Lower numbers of children, higher levels
of uncertainty and a lower increase in pension wealth suggest that younger women
continue having children until they have their (downwardly revised) desired number of
children. In essence, a pension reform will reduce the fertility of younger women less
than of older women in the short-run. In the long-run younger women can respond
stronger, as they have more scope for adjusting to their new desired level of fertility.3
To test these theoretical predictions empirically, our analysis differentiates between
long- and short-run outcomes (completed fertility at age 45 vs. annual childbearing
probabilities) as well as between younger and older women (aged 15-29 and 30-44).
2.2 Number of Previously Born Children
A woman’s probability of childbearing tends to be negatively correlated with the num-
ber of previously born children, i.e., with birth parity. As a direct implication of the
age-specific fertility responses, women will reduce higher birth parities if the pension
reform affected all women similarly. Introducing a full coverage pension scheme with
a de facto flat pension for rural workers will cut the overall number of children rural
women have. Hence, we do not expect negative effects on the first or second child but
on higher parities.
2.3 Gender of Previously Born Children
Women might react differently to the pension reform depending on whether they have
already given birth to a son or not. Such gender-sensitive behavior could be explained
by cultural norms or inheritance traditions favoring sons. While there is no indication
for gender-related abortions in Brazil (Chiavegatto Filho and Kawachi, 2013), prior
evidence suggests that women who have initially given birth to girls are more likely to
have additional children in the hope to conceive a boy (Reynolds, 2018); these women
are also less likely to use contraception (Arnold, 1992). The presence of a son seems
especially important for inheriting land: While inheritance laws are relatively gender-
neutral in Brazil, land is nevertheless typically passed to a son. In consequence, only
11% of land in Brazil is owned by women (Deere and Leo´n, 2003).
3As a theoretical possibility, young women may postpone having more children—maybe because
they want to wait and see how changes in the pension system materialize after the reform. In this
case, they would reduce fertility in the short-run in the years following the reform.
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3 Fertility and the Policy Reform in Brazil
3.1 Fertility Trends
Brazil has experienced sharply falling fertility since the middle of the 20th century.
The decline started in the 1940s in more aﬄuent urban areas and in the 1970s more
broadly. Possible explanations are changes in the demand for fertility (owing to ed-
ucational reforms or small-family norms evolving from the mass media) and in the
supply of family planning services (owing to health care reforms and access to con-
traception), or changes in nuptial or residential patterns (Martine, 1996; Rios-Neto
et al., 2018). Most of the expansion in urbanization, health care, education, marriage,
and telenovelas took place between the 1960s and early 1980s (Martine, 1996; Cae-
tano and Potter, 2004; La Ferrara et al., 2012). Starting in the 1990s, demographers
observe a fertility stopping behavior among older women with sterilization; fertility
becomes concentrated among women under 25 years of age with rising rates of teen
pregnancies (Rios-Neto et al., 2018). In this environment of declining fertility, Brazil
implemented a comprehensive pension reform.
3.2 The Pension Reform
Before the 1970s, only formally employed urban workers were entitled to old-age
pensions in fragmented occupation specific programs. With the Assistance to the
Rural Worker Program (FUNRURAL) in 1971, the first pension scheme for formally
employed rural workers was established; however, it left the vast group of informal or
self-employed rural workers uncovered.
The first free elections in 1985 marked the end of the military rule in Brazil and
paved the way for the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, approved
in October 1988. Unlike in most other countries, the Brazilian public social security
system (including pensions) was enshrined in the Constitution, making the pension
system hard to modify or even abolish. Accordingly, no significant reforms were
undertaken until the early 2000s (Hunter and Sugiyama, 2009).
With the codification into law, the coverage of social security was universalized
such that informal and rural workers got—for the first time in Brazilian history—
access to social protection and pension benefits. As benefits were equalized for eligible
individuals, the reform had a particularly strong impact on the rural population. The
implementation of the pension reform started with its lawful approval in July 1991.
Potential anticipation effects, e.g., that individuals foresee the reform and adjust their
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behavior accordingly, are weak owing to considerable information deficits about the
specific design of the new pension system before its implementation in 1991.
The rules and provisions of the Brazilian pension scheme before and after the
reform and the different pension formulae (old-age, lengths-of-service, disability) after
the reform are illustrated in Table 1.4
Before the reform, rural workers had to document formal employment to receive a
pension; but no more than 2-6% of rural women were legally employed in the 1980s,
according to official statistics (PNAD data; Neri (2002)). Even among the formally
employed, at most one household member was eligible for old-age pensions, mostly
the husband. Informal rural workers were entirely barred from the pension system.
For urban workers, the reform left the eligibility rules (e.g., qualifying age thresh-
olds) and the benefit calculation roughly unchanged. Quite differently, the pension
reform expanded coverage and pension benefits dramatically for rural workers. Irre-
spective of being able to prove formal employment or having made any social security
contributions, they became eligible for old-age retirement benefits from a qualifying
age of 55 (60) years for women (men).5 Even unpaid workers in subsistence agri-
culture became entitled. The pension generosity increased predominantly owing to
a reduced retirement age (women minus 10 years, men minus 5 years); an increase
in benefits from 50% to 100% of the minimum wage; and, the abolition of the one-
beneficiary-per-household restriction. In essence, the pension system in rural areas
was transformed from exclusive and meager to full-coverage and generous.
In line with unchanged rules, the indexed number of urban pension eligibles and
recipients seems hardly affected by the reform in 1991, according to Figure 1. Quite
differently, eligibility for rural pensions more than doubled between 1990 and 1992,
as did the number of rural pension recipients with a small delay. The enrollment
of newly eligible pensioners was not implemented immediately owing to bureaucratic
delays (De Carvalho Filho, 2008). However, benefits were automatically adjusted and
more than 2 million rural beneficiaries started receiving pensions until 1994, providing
a strong signal for the credibility of the reform (Dias and Amaral, 2001).
4The Brazilian pension reform of 1991 also affected the rules governing maternity leave. From an
individual perspective, the value of the old-age pension will be far larger than the value of a maternal
leave benefit. Moreover, benefits such as paid maternity leave reduce the relative costs of children
and would consequently increase fertility.
5Formally, an extremely soft documentation requirement (confirmation of work) was still in place.
Agricultural and fishing associations, unions, government agencies, and even the church were entitled
to confirm any kind of work in agriculture, under sharecropping/tenancy contracts, as co-owner of
land, or as worker in small scale mining. Anecdotal evidence suggests that destitute elderly were
granted proof of agricultural work even if they lacked birth certificates or other proof of age.
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Figure 1: Development of the indexed number of pension eligibles and
recipients (1981=100), Brazil 1981-99
Note: Graph shows the indexed number of rural and urban old-age pension eligibles and recipients
(1981=100). Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform imple-
mented in 1991 (black). Eligibility and receipt defined by age: 65 for rural elderly before the reform,
55/60 for women/men after the reform; 60/65 for urban women/men before and after the reform.
Rural and urban groups are defined according to occupation and location (for details see Section 4)
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
Figure 2 documents average pension incomes, paid out to rural and urban house-
holds in the years before and after the reform. Evidently, the reform in 1991 was
comparatively more beneficial for rural pensioners. The mean pension benefits of
urban pensioner households increased by 15% (118 BRL) whereas the increase was
136% (315 BRL) for rural pensioner households between 1990 and 1992.
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Figure 2: Average monthly pension income, Brazil 1981-99
Note: Graph shows average household pension income of rural and urban households with at least
one old-age pension recipient, based on eligibility by age. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved
in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are
defined according to household location. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
While the figure illustrates the immediate change to the cash flow of pensioners
after the reform, the identifying variation relevant to our fertility analysis is the one in
pension wealth of not-yet retired workers: Figure 3 shows the increase in accumulated
discounted gross pension wealth of rural and urban female workers (top) and rural
and urban worker couples (bottom). The pension wealth of rural worker couples rose
by factor three, illustrating that rural workers—and especially women—benefitted
disproportionately from the reform, while urban workers were hardly affected.
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Figure 3: Gross present pension wealth of Rural and Urban Female
Workers and of Rural and Urban Worker Couples with a
Women aged 15-44.
Note: Pre- and post-reform pension wealth is computed as the present value of expected old age
benefits before/after the reform adjusted for real interest rates and average survival probabili-
ties (computed using IBGE mortality tables; first time available in 1998): Pension Wealth =∑T−a
t=0 sa,t × 1(1+i)t × pensiont, with sa,t denoting the probability of a person of age a in a given
year surviving until year t; T − a, indicates the remaining maximum lifespan differentiated by sex
and birth cohort; i is a constant discount rate (12%); and pensiont denotes the old age pension
benefits in t. A non-retired person receives the pension starting in a future period t > 0, defined
by the person’s age and the regular retirement age. Rural and urban groups are defined according
to occupation and location (for details see Section 4). Figure A1 shows pension wealth of rural and
urban male workers. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
The notable increase in pension wealth of rural workers led to substantial declines
in poverty among rural households (Schwarzer, 2000; Schwarzer and Querino, 2002),
a spike in retirement among the rural elderly (De Carvalho Filho, 2008) and some
increase in school enrollment among children co-residing with beneficiaries (De Car-
valho Filho, 2012).
With the pension reform, Brazil embarked on a path from fragmented provision
to inclusive universalism that relied on changes in the population’s beliefs: The intro-
duction of the new Constitution and the move towards democracy were embedded in
new political organizing principles and a new and inclusive political language so that
citizens could believe in the announced reforms: The success of Brazil’s Constitu-
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tion is exemplified in the political competition based on universal access to elections,6
greater political stability, effective stabilization efforts, and the establishment of a
relatively professional bureaucracy (Melo, 2017). Surveys regarding the effectiveness
of the pension system in the 1990s reveal that 93% of rural households reported no
or very little difficulties in applying for the pension and only very short waiting time
periods before approval. Rural recipients reported very high levels of satisfaction with
the pension system and payout of benefits (Delgado and Cardoso Jr., 2005).7
4 Data
Our empirical analysis exploits several cross-sections (1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99, 2001-
09, 2011-14) of the Brazilian National Sample Household Survey (PNAD), conducted
annually by the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE) since 1971.8 The PNAD is a na-
tionally representative high-quality survey that collects a rich set of variables on in-
dividuals and their households;9 its sample size is gradually increasing in line with
population growth: from 1981 to 1985 (from 1986), the sample size was about 1/250
(1/500) of the Brazilian population.
Our analysis of fertility responses to the pension reform is based on two outcome
variables: First, to analyze completed fertility we compute the total number of births
of women aged 45: This measure allows a long-run assessment of changes in the
number of children, which is important to capture the demographic significance of the
reform and to rule out the possibility of timing effects in short-run fertility responses.
The information to construct this variable is obtained from the PNAD survey years
with a fertility section including information on the total number of births (alive or
dead), i.e., the 1984-85, 1992-93, 1995-99, 2001-09 and 2011-14 waves. Our sample
includes female respondents of the birth cohorts 1930 to 1969, who are between 45-69
years of age in a given survey year (N = 767, 465).10 We retrospectively assign the
6With the introduction of suffrage for illiterates the fraction of the total population (not eligible
voters) voting in presidential elections rose from below 20% in the 1960s to more than 50% in 1989.
7While interviews in 2012 reveal a relatively high level of distrust in legal and political insti-
tutions in Brazil in general, respondents articulated trust in the persistence of the pension system
(Lui Gallassi, 2012).
8The PNAD was not conducted in the years 1980, 1991, 1994, 2000 and 2010. Since 1981, the
entire country is covered in the survey, apart from extremely remote rural areas of the following States
of the Brazilian Federation: Acre, Amapa, Amazonas, Para, Rondonia and Roraima (accounting for
about 1.7% of the Brazilian population). The PNAD relies on the definition of rural areas as of 2004.
9For variable descriptions and descriptive statistics, see Table 2 and Tables A1-A8.
10In 1984, the fertility section is only answered by women up to 54 years old. We exclude women
above age 69 to account for the selective mortality of women with respect to their total number of
births, see e.g. Barclay and Kolk (2019). Further, we exclude observations if the total number of
reported births exceeds 20.
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reported total number of births of women older than 45 years to the year in which they
were 45 years old. We exclude individuals living in urban areas of those states that do
not cover rural areas in the PNAD (N = 50, 386). The sample size is N = 716, 215.
Second, to assess the short-run effect of the reform on the probability of childbear-
ing, we construct a dummy variable taking on the value of one if a woman has given
birth to a child in the past 12 months, zero otherwise (based on the household roster
and birth data).11 Our sample includes female respondents in fertile age between
15 and 44 in the years 1981-99 (N = 1, 548, 011).12 We exclude the 2000s from our
analysis owing to later reforms of the pension and health care systems. We exclude
individuals living in urban areas of those states that do not cover rural areas in the
PNAD (N = 118, 851) and female rural workers from mixed occupation households
(N = 102, 341).13 This leaves us with a working sample of N = 1, 326, 819.
Our research strategy exploits the fact that the reform was disproportionately
beneficial for rural workers (treatment group) compared to urban workers (control
group), in absolute and relative terms. In line with eligibility rules of the old-age
pension scheme we categorize rural and urban workers as follows: First, we rely on
the classification of the individual’s current occupation performed during the reference
week (45% of the long-run and 46% of the short-run sample). Second, for individuals
not employed during the reference week we use retrospective occupational information
available for up to 4 years prior to the reference year (5% and 6% of the samples).
Third, for individuals with insufficient personal occupational information we assign the
rural status based on the occupation of the family head (21% and 41% of the samples).
Finally, for individuals with insufficient personal and household head information we
assign the status using information on the household location, i.e., rural or urban
residence (29% and 7% of the samples).14
11Multiples or children born in the same year are coded like single births. This coding scheme
also implicitly accounts for the fact that multiple births are more common among older mothers.
12We keep women who are younger than 15 (N =251; 0.03% of the sample) or older than 44 (N
=1,171; 0.21% of the sample) and who give birth to a child in the sample and recode their ages to 15
or 44, respectively. In a robustness check we re-run our main regressions excluding women outside
the 15-44 age range and find very similar results (Table A9).
13In a robustness check we re-run our main regressions including mixed occupation households
and find very similar results (Table A10).
14As we allocate the urban or rural group predominantly based on occupation, selective residential
migration is not a threat to our identification strategy. Note, that internal migration in Brazil
was low in the relevant time period: Below 8% (5%) of urban (rural) inhabitants had changed
their residence across federal states in the past eight years, according to the censuses 1991 and
2000. Further, we investigate the robustness of our classification with alternative approaches, i.e.,
classifying the status only with personal occupation and household location (excluding step 3) or
only with household location (excluding steps 1-3); alternative approaches provide similar results
(Table A11). We acknowledge that some forward-looking workers may have self-selected into specific
occupations based on differences in the pension system. For women in the middle and late phase of
their fertility cycle this selection is, however, a predetermined characteristic.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Urban occupation Rural occupation
Sample A: Long-run analysis (N=596,928) (N=119,287)
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Total number of births 3.56 2.96 0 20 5.83 4.03 0 20
Childlessness (number of births=0) 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.08 0.26 0 1
Years of education 6.16 4.88 0 17 2.27 2.93 0 17
Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 0.77 0.42 0 1
Urban occupation Rural occupation
Sample B: Short-run analysis (N=1,103,371) (N=223,448)
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Newborn child under 1 year old 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
Age 27.79 8.39 15 44 27.24 8.86 15 44
Age partner 32.20 9.22 15 99 32.70 10.39 15 98
Years of education 6.79 4.08 0 17 2.93 2.78 0 17
Married 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.62 0.49 0 1
Household Income 2,806 4,658 0 820,542 1,106 2,530 0 183,294
Woman’s income share 0.19 0.30 0 1 0.07 0.20 0 1
Wealth index 0.15 0.93 -8.69 12.13 -0.22 1.01 -7.93 9.98
Not worked in reference week 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.70 0.46 0 1
Worked 1-10 hours ref. week 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.00 0.04 0 1
Worked 11-20 hours ref. week 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
Worked 21-30 hours ref. week 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Worked 31-40 hours ref. week 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1
Worked 41-50 hours ref. week 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
Worked 51-60 hours ref. week 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.03 0.16 0 1
Worked >60 hours ref. week 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.01 0.09 0 1
No. of adults in household 2.90 1.43 0 22 2.84 1.35 0 16
Caretaker in household 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.08 0.28 0 1
Note: Sample A consists of Brazilian women of the birth cohorts 1930 to 1969, aged 45-69. Sample
B consists of Brazilian women aged 15-44. Rural and urban groups are defined by: (1) occupation
during the reference week, (2) occupation up to 4 years prior to the reference year, (3) occupation of
the family head, (4) household location. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. For more information
see the variable descriptions in Tables A1-A8. Source: Sample A: PNAD 1984-85, 1992-93, 1995-99,
2001-09, 2011-14); Sample B: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
5 Identification Strategy
The Brazilian social security reform of 1991 provides plausibly exogenous variation for
the identification of the effect of the pension reform on reproductive behavior: As rural
workers received at most sketchy and meager pensions before the reform, the old-age
security motive was probably a key factor in their fertility decisions. Accordingly, the
substantial pension reform is expected to induce a disproportionate negative fertility
response among rural women.
To capture these effects, we employ three strategies: First, we implement an event
study (ES) approach for completed fertility of women aged 45. Second, we estimate
policy effects by exploiting the difference in annual birth probabilities over time (pre
vs. post reform) between treatment and control group (rural vs. urban women).
This difference-in-differences (DID) estimator captures the deviation of actual rural
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fertility trends from expected fertility trends that would have been observable without
the pension reform. Third, we estimate the semi-elasticity of fertility with respect to
pension wealth in an instrumental variable (IV) setup. Here, we regress the incidence
of childbearing on the natural log of accumulated gross present pension wealth, which
we instrument with the (treatment group × post reform) interaction.
5.1 Event Study Estimation
We explore the long-run effect of the pension reform in 1991 on completed fertility by
analyzing the total number of births of women aged 45 using an ES approach. Our
sample covers the period 1975-2014. We include interactions of the time dummies
and the treatment indicator, RURALg × Y EARt, for all periods in our model.
In practice we estimate the following equation:
yigtr = α +
23∑
t=−16
βt(RURALg × Y EARt)
+ γRURALg + λt + φr + ψ′Xigtr + igtr,
(1)
with the dependent variable yigtr representing the number of births of woman i at
age 45 of group g in region r in year t; RURALg is the indicator for the treatment
group. Y EARt are indicator variables for years t ∈ [−16, 23]. The specification
allows for sixteen (β−1, β−2, ..., β−16) pre-treatment (lead) effects and twenty-three
(β+1, β+2, ..., β+23) post-treatment (lag) effects; hence, the βt coefficients capture the
differential fertility trend between treatment and control groups for each year between
1975 and 2014. If the pension reform led to a decline in the total number of births, the
post-reform βt’s carry a negative sign. The model includes birth cohort fixed effects
λt and region (States of the Brazilian Federation) fixed effects φr to capture time-
invariant regional specific factors.15 Finally, our regression incorporates the covariate
vector Xigtr, including years of schooling and a dummy for married. The idiosyncratic
disturbance term is denoted by igtr. Standard errors are clustered at the region level
(States of the Brazilian Federation: 20 clusters).
An attractive feature of an event study is that the interactions of post-treatment
time dummies with the treatment indicator reflect dynamics of the completed fer-
tility response after the reform. For instance, the lag coefficients indicate whether
the treatment effect fades out, stays constant, or increases over time. The effect is
expected to increase after the reform since women close to 45, who have revised their
fertility target downwards, have only limited capacity to restrict their fertility given
15We implicitly assume that women have not changed their state of residence during their fertile
age. In fact, migration in Brazil was low in the relevant time period.
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their proximity to age 45 and their previously born children; younger women have a
longer remaining adaption period. Further, fertility norms adjust slowly. The lead
coefficients shed light on the common trend in completed fertility between the rural
(treatment) and urban (control) group before the reform; insignificant pre-treatment
coefficients are indicative of a common trend before the reform.
5.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
We investigate the short-run effect of the pension reform on the reproductive behavior
of women in fertile age using the DID method. The research design is not sensitive
to time-invariant differences between rural (treatment) and urban (control) workers,
like persistent family roles or tastes for fertility. At the same time, DID accounts for
macro trends that affect rural and urban areas similarly. This is relevant as Brazil
underwent a period of macroeconomic stabilization in the early 1990s. The universal
and exogenous change in pension generosity permits the estimation of causal fertility
responses by comparing childbearing trends between the treatment and control groups
before and after the pension reform (the treatment).
Formally expressed, our OLS reduced-form model with repeated cross-sections can
be written as:
yigtr = α + β(RURALg × POSTt)
+ γRURALg + λt + φr + ψ′Xigtr + igtr,
(2)
with the dependent variable yigtr representing a dummy equal to one if woman i
of group g in region r in year t has given birth to a child within the last 12 months
before the interview, zero otherwise. RURALg is an indicator variable for rural female
workers and POSTt a dummy variable that indicates observations in the years after
the pension reform in July 1991. The interaction of interest RURALg × POSTt
indicates rural female workers eligible for a future pension after the reform. The
coefficient of interest β captures the differential fertility trend between treatment and
control groups. If the pension reform led to a decline in fertility, β carries a negative
sign. The model includes a full set of time fixed effects λt; hence, our approach relies on
the assumption that no shock affects the two groups differently. Further, we add region
(States of the Brazilian Federation) fixed effects φr to capture time-invariant regional
specific factors. Finally, our regression set-up incorporates time-varying covariates
represented by the vector Xigtr. The set of controls includes individual characteristics
such as years of schooling16, a dummy for married, the age of the woman, the age of
16Our results are robust when using other definitions of education, like literacy or the highest
degree obtained (see Table A12).
15
the woman squared and dummies for birth parity, i.e., 1 to 5+ previously born children
(zero being the omitted category); job related characteristics are dummies for 1-10, 11-
20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60 and 60+ hours of professional work in the reference week
(zero hours, i.e., not working, being the omitted category) and the share of household
income (without pension income) earned by the woman; household characteristics are
the natural logarithm of monthly household income (without pension income)17 and
wealth (using the first principal component from a set of 45 indicators for housing
characteristics and durables), dummies for the number of adults in the household and a
dummy for the presence of a potential caretaker in the household (i.e., a non-working
pensioner aged 60 or above) as well as age of the partner and age of the partner
squared. Further we include time-varying control variables measured at the group
and regional level: At the regional level we control for the prevalence of TV reception
and for regional industry-specific trade shocks, as telenovelas (see La Ferrara et al.,
2012) and trade liberalization (see Braga, 2018) have been identified as influencing
factors of fertility in Brazil. At the regional level and differentiated by urban and rural
location, we control for the shares of protestants, of individuals of other faiths, or of
no religion (catholic being excluded as omitted category) and for shares of individuals
of different races, i.e., black, mixed-race and other (white being excluded as omitted
category); at a macro-regional level, we also control for child mortality rates (under
60 months of age), based on Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data.
The idiosyncratic disturbance term is denoted by igtr. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the region level (States of the Brazilian Federation: 20 clusters). Since the
Brazilian pension reform can be considered unanticipated and exogenous, the inclu-
sion of covariates should not change our estimates of β, while improving precision. To
illustrate this, we include covariates in the results tables in a step-wise fashion.
Taking advantage of the large sample size, we perform subgroup analyses to test
whether the effect of the pension reform differs across women at different phases of
their fertility cycle. First, we split the estimation sample into younger (aged 15-
29) and older (aged 30-44) women and estimate model (2) for both sub-samples. In
the robustness section, we also address even more granular age groups. Second, we
investigate the intensive margin of fertility by splitting the sample into groups of
women at different birth parities: This analysis sheds light on the reform effect on
childbearing for women with zero, one, two, three, four, and at least five previously
born children. Finally, we also separate the sample into groups of women who already
have at least one son, at least two sons, only daughters and those who have no prior
17Including pension income does not change the results, see Table A12, col. 2.
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children at all. Comparing these estimates sheds light on the sensitivity of fertility
responses to the presence of a boy—and, hence, a potential heir—in the family.
The validity of DID rests on the assumption that rural and urban women would
not have had any systematic different fertility trends in the absence of the reform.
We show the plausibility of the common trend assumption using a test method in the
spirit of Granger (1969). The test sample contains ten pre-reform (1981-90) and seven
post-reform (1992-93, 1995-99) years. The interaction terms, RURALg×Y EARt, test
for differences between treatment and control groups, conditional on a full set of group
and time effects and including all covariates.
Each estimate of Table A13 reports the year specific difference between treatment
and control for the full sample (col. 1), the sample of younger women (col. 2) and
the sample of older women (col. 3). The fertility trends are not significantly different
between rural and urban women in the pre-treatment period, as evidenced by the
insignificant pre-reform interaction coefficients, almost all of which are very close to
zero. Only one estimate (in 1982 for older women) out of 27 (3.7%) is statistically
significant at the 10% level, which is a fully acceptable incidence rate for Type-I errors.
This suggests that rural and urban women were on the same fertility trajectory before
the pension reform.
5.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Beside the policy effect of the pension reform, we aim at estimating the semi-elasticity
of fertility with respect to pension wealth. Since pension wealth is potentially endoge-
nous, we exploit the timing of the policy and the differential impact across population
groups in Brazil, i.e., the RURALg × POSTt interaction, as an instrumental vari-
able. Therefore, we apply a 2SLS estimation strategy that allows us to crystallize the
exogenous variation in pension wealth.
In the first stage, we regress the age-specific accumulated discounted gross pension
wealth (pensionwealthigtr) on the instrument as well as the full set of covariates:
ln(pensionwealth)igtr = σ + θ(RURALg × POSTt)
+ ηRURALg + δt + τr + κ′Xigtr + µigtr.
(3)
In the second stage, we regress birth probabilities on the predicted values of pension
wealth:
yigtr = α + βln( ̂pensionwealth)igrt
+ γRURALg + λt + φr + ψ′Xigtr + igtr.
(4)
17
This estimation procedure requires a sufficiently strong and exogenous instrument.
We assess the strength of the instrument with the F-statistic of the first stage, which
exceeds the critical value multiple times across all samples. Also, t-statistics of the
excluded instrument in the first stage are close to or over 60, suggesting a very strong
instrument. The exogeneity of the instrument is plausible since the universal pension
reform was implemented exogenously and without anticipation. Also, the pension
scheme did not create incentives to work. Essentially, the reform affects fertility levels
only through its effect via pension wealth.
5.4 Addressing Potential Confounders
Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that no other policy changes or
alternative determinants of fertility explain the disproportionate decline in rural fer-
tility behavior. Therefore we analyze trends in marriage rates, education, health care,
incomes, wealth and employment between rural and urban women and show that the
treatment and control groups were on very similar trajectories regarding these factors
over time. We also discuss the role of cultural change in Brazil with respect to religion
and telenovelas, the role of trade liberalization and patterns regarding the quantity-
quality trade-off between the number of children and the investment made in their
quality, i.e., education. In our regression analysis we control for these factors.
Marriage. Marriage and fertility are positively correlated. But neither the Con-
stitution nor the pension reform contain any changes affecting the incentives to marry,
not least since pension eligibility is independent of marital status. In Figure 4 (top
left) we compare marriage rates of rural and urban female workers. Average marriage
rates are higher for rural women but the rates tend to be very stable over the 19 year
observation period.
Education. As more educated women face greater opportunity costs of having
children, and as education is in general negatively correlated with fertility, an unbal-
anced educational expansion between rural and urban areas may directly influence the
observed fertility rates. The 1988 Constitution mentions education as a basic right.
To reduce the illiteracy rate elementary education was made compulsory regardless of
age implying compulsory education for adults in so-called popular schools. However,
a lack of schools delayed the desired expansion by more than ten years.18 In Figure 4
(top right) we compare years of schooling of female rural and urban workers. Average
years of schooling increase over time; however, rural and urban women are on similar
18Only in 1998, Brazil set up the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Primary Educa-
tion and Valorisation of Teachers (FUNDEF) to improve enrolment rates, with some effect (De Mello
and Hoppe, 2005; Borges, 2008).
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paths. Another threat to identification might stem from the educational expansion
for children. Since higher education increases the economic value of a child, parents
could afford their targeted level of old-age support with fewer children, as predicted
by the quantity-quality trade-off theory. However, since the educational expansion
was severely delayed and limited to primary education (which had been free and—in
theory—compulsory before) we expect no differential growth in education among chil-
dren of rural women. When analyzing years of education of children aged 15 or 7-24,
we find positive secular trends, but no differences between urban and rural households
or between boys and girls (Figure A4).
Health. Changes in health care might explain the fertility decline if improvements
in child survival were stronger in rural areas. However, the infant and child mortality
decline in the critical period between 1986 and 1996 was stronger in urban (38%)
than rural (32%) areas, according to data from the DHS (Figure 4, middle left).
Consequently, we would underestimate the true fertility decline owing to the pension
reform. Another explanation might be a disproportionate expansion in access to
health care (e.g., contraception) in rural areas; this might improve rural women’s
ability to control fertility. The major reform for the provision of family planning
services, however, took place only after the pension reform in 1997 (Caetano and
Potter, 2004).
Economic empowerment. Fertility may depend on women’s relative economic
potential and power within the household. Comparing the income of women as a
share of household income and, therefore, the relevance of women’s paid work for the
household, we do not find any disproportionate gain among rural women (Figure 4,
middle right).
Income and wealth. The tightening of minimum wage rules in the Constitution
of 1988 might be problematic if the rural population experienced disproportionate
income gains. Figure A5 (top left) compares average monthly household incomes
(excluding pension income) for households with rural or urban women in childbearing
age. Household income fluctuates over time, but there is no differential trend in
household income after the Constitution was approved; further, the level difference
between rural and urban households is stable for absolute (Figure A5, top left) and
relative (Figure 4, middle right) income as well as for wealth (Figure A5, top right).
Labor force participation. Greater female labor force participation implies
greater opportunity costs of children and may, hence, lower fertility. Brazil underwent
comprehensive unilateral trade liberalization during the late 1980s (for agricultural
products and mining) and 1990s (for manufacturing), possibly affecting the labor
market. However, since the sectoral distribution of women remained almost constant
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during the 1990s and 2000s and since female workers were mostly employed in the
non-tradable sector (with no discernible spill-over effects), women were at most mildly
affected by trade liberalization (Gaddis and Pieters, 2017). Given that urban and ru-
ral workers were exposed to similar trade shocks in terms of tariff reductions (Figure
A6), trade liberalization should not confound the fertility effect of the pension reform.
In the regressions we control for the region-industry specific trade shocks by incorpo-
rating annual tariff rates taken from De Paiva Abreu (2004).19 The trajectory of labor
force participation between rural and urban women is quite comparable, suggesting
that the fertility pattern cannot be driven by differential employment growth (Figure
4, bottom left). At the same time, average working hours of women exhibit a declin-
ing trend already before the reform. After the reform we observe a disproportionate
fall in the working hours of female rural workers (Figure 4, bottom right), which is
attributable to the emergence of part-time jobs (11-20 hours) in rural areas (Figure
A7); if anything, this pattern works against declining fertility of female rural workers.
Religion. Brazil experienced a phase of cultural modernization during the 1980s
and 1990s. The influence of the catholic church, with its promotion of traditional
family roles and the rejection of modern contraception, diminished slowly. Since the
PNAD does not include consistent information on religious affiliations of individuals
over time, we use Brazilian Census data from 1980, 1991 and 2000 to generate the
regional composition of religious affiliations, for which we control in our regressions.
In graphical analysis the most marked observation is a rising share of protestants, of
people of other faiths and of people without religion, at the expense of catholicism
(Figure A8). This trend is more pronounced in urban than in rural areas and cannot
explain the stronger decline of fertility in rural areas. However, membership in the
church may be an imprecise determinant of fertility. Based on World Value Survey
(WVS) data from 1991 and 1997 we analyze the self-reported importance of religion
in an individual’s life and confidence in the church (see Figure A9). For about 90% of
rural and 80% of urban individuals, religion is very or rather important in life. These
shares slightly increase from 1991 to 1997 for both groups. With about 80% of rural
and about 70% of urban individuals there is also high trust in the churches. There
are no disproportionate shifts in these variables between rural and urban individuals
that could plausibly explain the stronger decline of fertility in rural areas.
Culture. The general modernization of the Brazilian society is also reflected in
the expansion of the coverage of Brazilian territory with Rede Globo television. This
led to almost nationwide broadcasting of telenovelas which tend to portray modern,
small families. While this expansion mainly took place in the early 1980s, we control
19Methodologically based on Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017). See Appendix A8 for details.
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for Rede Globo-coverage in our regressions to account for earlier findings that soap
operas have contributed to a decline in fertility (La Ferrara et al., 2012).
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Figure 4: Confounding factor trends: Women aged 15-44
Note: Graphs show average marriage rates, years of education, child mortality rates, income of
women as a share of household income, labor force participation rates, and weekly hours of work
for rural and urban female workers. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray);
Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Figure A2 shows the trends for women aged 15-29 and Figure
A3 for women aged 30-44. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
6 Fertility Response to the Pension Increase
The plausible behavioral response of women to the pension reform is a reduction in
fertility. Indeed, a comparison of DHS data on the number of desired children indicates
that urban women lowered their planned fertility by 0.51 children between 1986 and
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1996 while rural women reduced it by 0.59 children (Table A14). The differential
is especially large among women aged 30 to 44 who have fewer than the number of
children they desire (-0.43 vs. -1.02).20 Yet, how does this change in the desired
number of children translate into actual fertility? Older women may immediately
stop having children. In essence, we expect a negative short- and long-run response
of these women. Younger women may continue having children until they have born
their (revised) desired number of children. This implies no short-run, but a negative
long-run response. In the following we assess the realized fertility outcomes.
6.1 Long-Run Effects: ES Estimation
The introduction of the Brazilian rural old-age pension led to a significant decline
in women’s completed fertility rate (total number of births at age 45), as depicted
in the rural vs. urban time series (Figure 5, left panel): While rural women had on
average about 7.1 children in the 1970s and early 1980s, the comparable number was
4.8 children for urban women. This sizeable gap of 2.3 children between both groups
remained constant up to the year of the pension reform (1991) albeit fertility levels
declined by one child per woman. In 2010, rural (urban) women now have on average
about 3.6 (2.3) children (for sample size reasons we trim the graph in 2010).
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Figure 5: Completed fertility: Total births and Differences in total
births at the age of 45
Note: Left graph shows the average total number of births (alive and dead) of women at age 45.
Right graph shows ES estimates of the pension reform for the total number of births (alive and dead)
of women at the age of 45 before and after the reform. 90% confidence interval based on standard
errors clustered at the regional (federal state) level. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in
1988 (light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined
as in Table 2. Source: PNAD 1984-85, 1992-93, 1995-99, 2001-09, 2011-14.
20Accordingly, we find a stronger increase in contraceptive use among rural compared to urban
women from 1986 to 1996 (see Table A15). Note, that this is not driven by differences in access to
contraception (Caetano and Potter, 2004).
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The right panel of Figure 5 depicts estimates of our ES approach, i.e., the com-
pleted fertility gap between urban and rural women compared to the base year 1987:
The estimates fluctuate closely around zero until the year when the rural pension was
introduced. After 1991, completed fertility rates declined at much faster pace in rural
than in urban areas (with a modest and plausible lag of one to two years). Until
2010, the rural-urban gap has shrunk by about 1.3 births per women. The first year
in which the estimator for completed fertility turns significant is 1994. This implies
a quick fertility reduction among 45 year old women after the pension reform: The
introduction of rural pensions has an economically significant and lasting effect on
fertility in Brazil.
6.2 Short-Run Effects: DID Estimation
Next, we turn to short-run behavioral responses in childbearing by analyzing the
probability that a woman in childbearing age (15-44 years old) delivers a baby in a
given year. Across all samples the childbearing probabilities of rural women exceed
those of urban women and childbearing rates decline over the entire observation period
(Figure 6): The top panel of Figure 6 compares fertility rates for all rural and urban
women, with the dashed line representing the urban counterfactual trend fixed at the
year 1987. In other words, the dashed line depicts the fertility trend of urban women
adjusted to rural women’s fertility level as of 1987. Before the reform in 1991 fertility
rates between rural and urban women develop similarly. After 1991 and in line with
the disproportionate change in pension wealth we observe a relatively stronger (i.e.,
steeper) decline of childbearing probabilities of female rural workers in the full sample.
There is an immediate drop in the annualized childbearing probability of rural women
by 1 percentage point, which increases to 2 percentage points by the end of the 1990s
(equivalent to -17%). This decline is not driven by younger women in the 15-29 year
age range (bottom left panel), but by women aged 30-44 (bottom right panel). The
overall unconditional childbearing decline among older rural women exceeds 30%.
These differences by age are consistent with theoretical predictions: Older women
are expected to respond more immediately due to survival, information, saturation,
pension wealth and salience effects. Younger women seem to continue having babies
until they reach their (downwardly revised) desired fertility level.
This finding is reflected in DID estimates regarding the probability that a woman
has given birth in the past 12 months, for three different samples (Table 3): all women
aged 15-44 (top), young women aged 15-29 (middle) and older women aged 30-44
(bottom). The six columns represent different specifications: without controls (col.
1), with year and region fixed effects (col. 2), with individual (col. 3), job related (col.
23
4), household (col. 5), and with group/region controls (col. 6). The highly significant
reform effect in the full sample of women in childbearing age is around one percentage
point irrespective of the chosen specification. This is equivalent to a decline in the
probability of childbearing by 7-10%.
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Figure 6: Birth Probabilities: Pooled (Women aged 15-44) and Subgroups
(Women aged 15-29 vs. 30-44), Brazil 1981-99
Note: Graphs show 3-year moving averages (2-years at the edges: 1981-82, 1989-90, 1992-93 and
1998-99) of birth probabilities, i.e., average childbearing (0/1) rates within the last 12 months.
Counterfactual trend as of 1987: gray dashed line. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988
(light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in
Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
In the young cohort the estimated effects are all very close to zero and none is
statistically different from zero. In the older cohort the effects are large: all coefficients
are highly significant at around -0.03, equivalent to a decline of 25% and 28% in the
propensity of childbearing in the past year. These estimates are very similar to the
aggregate, unconditional drop in birth rates depicted in Figure 6; their stability across
specifications suggests that the pension effect is orthogonal to the large number of
individual, job related, household, regional and group controls. This supports the
identifying assumption of the reform being a valid source of exogenous variation.
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Table 3: DiD Regression Results: Pooled (Women Aged 15-44) and Sub-
groups (Women aged 15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID women aged 15-44 -0.008** -0.008** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
in % to baseline -7.0 -6.6 -9.9 -9.6 -8.8 -9.8
DID women aged 15-29 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
in % to baseline 3.0 3.5 0.4 0.1 0.9 0.1
DID women aged 30-44 -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
in % to baseline -28.4 -28.0 -27.5 -26.4 -25.2 -24.6
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
N : 15-44 (1,326,819); 15-29 (780,682); 30-44 (546,137)
R2 15-44: 0.006 0.009 0.103 0.109 0.114 0.115
R2 15-29: 0.004 0.006 0.148 0.156 0.161 0.161
R2 30-44: 0.011 0.016 0.057 0.061 0.067 0.068
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Individual covariates: years of schooling, dummy for married, age of the
woman, age of the woman squared and dummies for 1 to 5+ prior children (0 omitted). Job related
covariates: dummies for 1-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60 and 60+ hours of professional work
in reference week (0 hours, i.e., not working omitted) and share of household income (excl. pensions)
earned by the woman. Household covariates: log of monthly household income (excl. pensions),
household wealth, dummies for the number of adults in the household, dummy for the presence of
a potential caretaker in the household, i.e., a non-working pensioner aged 60 or older, age of the
partner and age of the partner squared. Regional/group covariates: dummy for Rede Globo coverage
in the past year (based on La Ferrara et al. (2012) data), regional shares of religious affiliations, i.e.,
protestant, other faith and no religion (catholic omitted, based on Census data), regional race shares,
i.e., Black, Mixed-race and Others including Asian, Indigenous and Other (white omitted, based on
Census data), macro-regional child mortality (mortality rates of children under 60 months of age by
macro-region, i.e., north-east, mid-west, south, and south-east, based on DHS data) and regional
industry-specific trade shocks (based on methodology of Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) and annual
tariff rates taken from De Paiva Abreu (2004)). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2.
Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
A number of covariates are worthy of attention (see Table A16): Among the
individual level covariates marriage is positively associated with fertility, as expected.
Controlling for marriage increases the R-squared substantially. Age and age of the
woman’s partner are positively correlated with fertility (with negative square terms).
Dummies for the number of previously born children as well as dummies for working
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hours brackets (if working) are negatively related to fertility. Years of schooling are
negatively correlated with fertility in most of our regressions, as are the woman’s
household income share, household income (excluding old-age pension income of co-
residing pensioners) and household wealth. The number of adults in the household
and the presence of a potential caretaker are positively associated with fertility. Rede
Globo (telenovelas) coverage is negative especially for older women, as found in earlier
studies. Child mortality rates are positively related to fertility, as expected.
6.3 Pension Wealth: IV Estimation
While the effect of the Brazilian pension reform of 1991 on fertility is policy relevant,
economists also care about the generally more comparable effect of pension wealth
on the childbearing propensity. This effect can be uncovered as the semi-elasticity of
pension wealth using a 2SLS IV regression in which the log pension wealth is instru-
mented with the RURALg × POSTt interaction in the first stage. The instrument is
sufficiently strong across all samples (F-statistic > 3475, T-statistic of the excluded
instrument > 58). The estimates confirm the earlier results in a more generalized
set-up (Table 4): A 100% increase in pension wealth reduces the probability that a
child was born in the past year by 0.6 percentage points. Given that a couple’s pen-
sion wealth increases by almost 300%, the overall effect is larger than the estimated
policy effect in Table 3 (3 × -0.006 > -0.012), although the two estimates do not
statistically differ from each other. Below the main results we provide estimates for
alternative discount rate specifications. If assuming—in line with the literature—that
less wealthy households (Becker and Mulligan, 1997) or rural households (Anderson
et al., 2004) have higher discount rates, the estimated semi-elasticities get closer to
the policy effect.
The semi-elasticity for the younger and older sub-samples estimates the response
for a comparable pension wealth increase (in %) between younger and older women.
This approach deviates from estimating the policy effect for the two age groups which
exhibit different pension wealth levels owing to the discounting horizon; it implicitly
switches off the pension wealth effect described in the theoretical section. As columns
(2) and (3) illustrate IV estimates for both age groups are negative; however, only the
estimate for the older groups is significantly different from zero. This result suggests
that differences in pension wealth alone cannot explain the differential response of
younger and older women.
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Table 4: IV Regression Results: Semi-elasticity of birth probabilities to
Pension Wealth
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Women aged 15-29 Women aged 30-44
Log of pension wealth -0.006*** -0.000 -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First-stage statistics:
Dependent Variable Pension wealth of woman and her partner
Instrument Rural work x After reform interaction
Coefficient 1.951*** 1.873*** 2.084***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.028)
F-test 4119.95 3478.38 5673.48
T-statistic of excl. instrument 64.19 58.98 75.32
Partial R2 of excl. instrument 0.101 0.116 0.091
Estimates for alternative discount rates:
Log of pension wealth -0.005*** 0.000 -0.012***
30% pre vs. 12% post (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Log of pension wealth -0.004*** 0.000 -0.008***
30% rural vs. 12% urban (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year and region FE Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note) Yes Yes Yes
N : 1,326,819 780,682 546,137
R2: 0.115 0.161 0.065
Note: IV estimates of the pension reform. ‘First-stage’ regression of log pension wealth on the
instrument (RURALg×POSTt) and all other covariates. Power of the first-stage regression reported
with F-statistics. Dependent variable in the ‘second-stage’: Dummy, whether a child was born in
the last 12 months. Full set of covariates, as in Table 3, column 6. Pension wealth computed as
in Figure 3 with a constant discount rate of 12% for the main specification (c.f. Azzoni and Isai
(1994)). Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded.
Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
6.4 Number of Previously Born Children: DID Estimation
If women do not change their fertility behavior as long as their family is small, but
stop having children once they reach their downwardly adjusted desired number of
children, we observe stronger fertility effects at higher birth parities. This is expected
to be more prevalent among women in the middle or late phase of their fertility cycle
who have—on average—already born more children than younger women. Indeed,
we find that most of the reduction in childbearing appears at higher birth parities
(Figure 7 and Table 5).
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Figure 7: Birth Probabilities by Birth Parity
Note: Graphs show 3-year moving averages (2-years at the edges: 1981-82, 1989-90, 1992-93 and
1998-99) of birth probabilities, i.e., average childbearing (0/1) rates within the last 12 months, by
birth parity (the number of previous children) up to 5+. Counterfactual trend as of 1987: gray dashed
line. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform implemented in
1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded.
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
While the probability of having a first or second child has not significantly declined
after the pension reform (top panel of Figure 7 and columns 1 and 2 of Table 5), the
fertility effects turns negative at the third child and increasingly so at higher birth
parities (middle and bottom panel of Figure 7 and columns 3 to 6 of Table 5). Our
estimates (Table 5) show that the childbearing probability declines by 12% (2nd birth
parity), 21% (3rd birth parity), 35% (4th parity), and 28% (5th+ parity), respec-
tively. These findings support the stopping hypothesis and can at least partly explain
the stronger adjustment effect among older women (who tend to have already more
children).
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Table 5: DiD Regression Results: By Birth Parity (Women aged 15-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3 Parity 4 Parity 5+
DID women aged 15-44 0.025*** 0.002 -0.012** -0.018*** -0.032*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
7.8 1.0 -12.4 -21.3 -34.5 -27.7
Year and region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N : 208,539 273,684 307,041 222,715 125,239 189,601
R2: 0.135 0.096 0.071 0.070 0.085 0.109
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born in
the last 12 months. Full set of covariates, as in Table 3, column 6 (dummies for 0 to 5+ prior children
omitted). Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded.
Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
While the results suggest that the pension reform made it more likely for women
to have fewer children, does it also make women stop having children altogether? If
children were predominantly reared for old-age provision, the need to have any children
would be dramatically reduced after the reform. However, we find no evidence for
an increase in childlessness after the pension expansion: Figure A10 shows that the
fraction of women aged 45 who have never given birth to a child remained quite
stable at 11% for urban women and 8% for rural women, although the modest sample
sizes lead to bumpy time series. Nevertheless, there is no clear indication of a higher
prevalence of childlessness in the ES set-up.
6.5 Gender of Previously Born Children: DID Estimation
We find significant differences in the probability of childbearing between women who
have at least one son, at least two sons, only daughters or no children at all. For these
four samples, Figure 8 shows the probabilities of childbearing in the past 12 months
(Figure A11 for women aged 15-29 and women aged 30-44 separately). Figure 8 shows
consistent declines in childbearing only for women with at least one or two previously
born sons. Once we turn to the econometric evaluation in a DID framework (Table 6),
we find strong and significant effects only for the overall sample of women with at
least one or two boys, a result that is entirely driven by older women aged 30-44.
This group reduces the probability of childbearing in the past 12 months by 30%.
Women with daughters or without children do not reduce fertility in any of the three
age samples.
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Figure 8: Birth Probabilities by Older Children’s Gender: Women aged
15-44
Note: Graphs show 3-year moving averages (2-years at the edges: 1981-82, 1989-90, 1992-93 and
1998-99) of birth probabilities, i.e., average childbearing (0/1) rates within the last 12 months,
conditional on whether women had already given birth to at least one son, at least two sons, only
daughters or no children at all. Counterfactual trend as of 1987: gray dashed line. Vertical lines:
new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural
and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD
1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
Table 6: DiD Regression Results: by Older Children’s Gender (Women
aged 15-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 1+ sons 2+ sons Only daughters No children
DID women aged 15-44 -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 0.003 0.025***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
in % to baseline -9.9 -16.3 -21.2 1.5 7.8
DID women aged 15-29 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.011** 0.041***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
in % to baseline -0.2 -3.9 -6.6 4.7 9.8
DID women aged 30-44 -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.002 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
in % to baseline -24.6 -28.1 -29.9 -2.8 7.8
Year and region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15-44: 1,326,819 820,066 396,070 506,753 208,539
N 15-29: 780,682 442,466 201,306 338,216 151,566
N 30-44: 546,137 377,600 194,764 168,537 56,973
R2 15-44: 0.115 0.086 0.077 0.137 0.135
R2 15-29: 0.161 0.140 0.141 0.158 0.127
R2 30-44: 0.068 0.069 0.078 0.080 0.102
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Full set of covariates, as in Table 3, column 6. Rural and urban group definition
as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level
in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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6.6 Financial Gap in the PAYG Pension System
Given its favorable demographic composition in the decades prior to 1988, Brazil
opted (like most developing countries) for a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension scheme.
In PAYG systems large cohorts of young workers provide for the smaller cohorts of
concurrent retirees. The Brazilian pension reform, however, does not only increase
the benefit (i.e., expenditure) side of the social security system by expanding gen-
erosity; it also reduces the contribution (i.e., income) base by lowering the number of
future contributors through today’s reduced fertility. To illustrate the total financial
gap in the Brazilian PAYG system we conduct a simple static back-of-the-envelope
calculation, after fertility levels have adjusted to the new equilibrium. We decompose
the total reform effect into a ‘generosity effect’ and a ‘contribution base effect’.
Assuming that the Brazilian PAYG system is actuarially fair the benefit side with
average pension payment B being paid out to N recipients for 13 monthly installments
will equal the contribution side with L contributors paying twelve monthly contribu-
tions C. The pension reform now makes pensions more generous and, hence, costly.
It introduces a rise in the benefit level B and a growth in the number of pension
recipients N . At the same time the reform reduces the fiscal base of contributions by
reducing the future number of contributors L through the fertility effect (-1.3 children
per rural woman).
The total long-run financial gap resulting from the reform in the Brazilian PAYG
system is:
−(∆B × 13×∆N)× (1 + AC) + (C × 12)×∆L (5)
with the administrative cost AC of the pension system being assumed to equal either
7% (Mitchell, 1998), 10.75% (Zockun, 1983) or 14.5%.21
We now estimate the relative contributions of the ‘generosity effect’ vs. the ‘con-
tribution base effect’ using PNAD data, based on the assumption that environmental
factors such as earnings or immigration and policy variables such as tax rates or so-
cial security contributions remain constant. Expressed as a fraction of GDP, the total
funding gap with AC = 10.75% is around 0.7% in 1995, 1.0% in 2001, 1.2% in 2005
and 1.8% in 2011. These results are consistent with the World Bank (2003), which
reports that the Brazilian Pension System for the private sector reached a deficit of
0.9% of GDP in 1999. Importantly, the ‘generosity effect’ accounts for only a modest
part of the total financial gap (about 20% in 2011), while the ‘contribution base effect’
of the fertility decline weighs heavily from an actuarial perspective.
21The World Bank (2005) reports administrative costs of the Brazilian pension system of 10-15%.
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Table 7: Funding Gap of the Brazilian PAYG Pension System as a Result
of the Reform (in % of GDP)
Year 1995 2001 2005 2011
AC =7%
Generosity effect 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.35
Contribution base effect 0.61 0.86 0.96 1.42
Total financial gap 0.68 0.97 1.14 1.77
AC =10.75%
Generosity effect 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.36
Contribution base effect 0.61 0.87 0.98 1.46
Total financial gap 0.68 0.99 1.16 1.81
AC =14.5%
Generosity effect 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.37
Contribution base effect 0.61 0.88 0.99 1.49
Total financial gap 0.69 1.00 1.19 1.86
Note: The table shows calculations of the long term financial gap of the Brazilian PAYG pension
system as a result of the reform (in % of GDP as of 2012), decomposed into a ‘generosity effect’
and a ‘contribution base effect’. The long term loss in rural payroll contributors is computed as
the difference between the observed number of children and the hypothetical number of children if
completed fertility was 1.3 children higher per rural women. Average pension payments and pension
recipients are taken from the PNAD. Social security contributions: Monthly average gross income
× 9.3% (employees average contribution rate) + monthly average gross income × 36.3% (employers
contribution rate). Average gross income: Average net income + Average net income × 17.5% (the
average marginal tax rate). Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99, 2001-09, 2011-14.
This computation illustrates the economic significance of the estimated fertility
effect. It highlights that fertility consequences of public pension policies are econom-
ically costly and can affect the sustainability and political acceptance of a PAYG
pension system in the long-run.
7 Discussion and Robustness
In this section we discuss the robustness of our results. First, we analyze more gran-
ular age groups. Second, we investigate alternative specifications regarding control
variables and time trends. Third, we test the sensitivity of our results with respect to
regional, occupational and age-specific sample choices. Fourth, we address alternative
error correlation structures.
7.1 Analysis of Granular Age Groups
Our main findings suggest that younger and older women respond differently to the
pension reform. To investigate the relationship between age and effect size further
we assess DID estimators in six five-year age cohorts (15-19; 20-24; 25-29; 30-34;
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35-39; 40-44). Separate regressions suggest (see Table A17) no significant negative
fertility response among the youngest two groups. The negative effect for the age
group 25-29 is marginally (in)significant, depending on the specification. The three
oldest age groups exhibit highly significant negative fertility responses to the pension
reform. The relative reduction in fertility (conditional on the cohort-specific baseline
fertility rate) is increasing with age. While women aged 30-34 reduce their probability
of childbearing by 23%, the corresponding values are 26% and 35% for women aged
35-39 and 40-44.
In a further refinement we estimate (2) with the full set of control variables for
fifteen 2-year age cohorts. The results are graphically depicted in Figure A12. As
before the pension reform has no systematic significant impact on the fertility of rural
women up to age 30, with the 90% confidence interval mostly containing the zero.
The pension reform, however, has a consistent significant negative effect on fertility of
women above age 30. The point estimates between age 30 and 44 are all remarkably
similar and range between −0.2 and −0.4: Only women in the middle or late phase
of their fertility cycle exhibit a significantly negative fertility response to the pension
reform.
7.2 Alternative Specifications
Alternative model specifications tend to provide very similar results: In Table A12, col.
1 we control for alternative educational variables. While average years of schooling
(our control variable in the main analysis) progressed on similar trajectories between
urban and rural women, we observe growth in primary school degrees by 15 percent-
age points in rural and 10 percentage points in urban areas between 1981 and 1991
(see Figure A14); the main contributor of this rise stems from the introduction of
compulsory education for adults after 1988. This was accompanied by rising shares
of secondary and tertiary attainments among urban women. Hence, we amend our
previous regression (2) by adding dummy variables for the highest degree obtained
(primary, secondary or tertiary) as well as a dummy for literacy. In the following
columns we control for the share of retirement income in total household income (col.
2), for family income variables such as the log of monthly family income without pen-
sions and the share of family income earned by the woman of childbearing age (col. 3),
for two dummies indicating whether the woman worked unpaid or in the public sector
(col. 4), for additional square terms of years of schooling, log of household income
without pensions, share of family income earned by the woman of childbearing age
without pensions and household wealth (col. 5), for age and age of the woman’s part-
ner (col. 6), and for dummies of age and age of the woman’s partner (col. 7). We also
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assess the sensitivity of our results with respect to different time trend specifications.
In Table A18 we re-estimate model (2) with linear time trends or linear region-specific
time trends. None of the alternative specifications alters our main results.
7.3 Sample Selection
We conduct a series of robustness checks regarding sample choices: First, we re-
run our analysis in all three types of residential areas separately: So-called not self-
representative municipalities (Table A19, upper panel), which are included in the
PNAD sample only with a probability proportional to the inhabitant population; self-
representative areas (Table A19, middle panel), which are completely sampled; and
Metropolitan areas (Table A19, lower panel). Despite substantially smaller sample
sizes, our results are preserved in all three subgroups: Birth probabilities are nega-
tively affected in the full sample (statistical significance is not always maintained);
the effect is not different from zero among younger women and significantly negative
among older women.
Second, we re-define treatment vs. control groups: (1) using only household resi-
dence and (2) using only personal occupational information and household residence
(Table A11). Our results are robust across different treatment specifications.
Third, we include couples in which wife and husband work in different occupational
areas, i.e., in a rural and an urban occupation (Table A10). This increases the sample
size by 7.7%, but does not change any of the results no matter whether we control
with a dummy indicator for these added women (top panel) or not (bottom panel).
Fourth, we exclude 1422 women (0.1% of the sample) who gave birth at ages
younger than 15 years or older than 44 years and who were previously recoded as
15 or 44 years old as is standard in much of the demographic literature (Table A9).
Again, the omission of these women has no effect on the results.
Fifth, we can also rule out that women postpone childbearing beyond the cut-off
age of 45 years (for instance, if the oldest mothers were 38 years old in 1985 but 47
years old in 1995). Figure A13 shows age density-plots for childbearing women in 1985
and 1995. Over time, female rural and urban women tend not to give birth later, but
earlier as described in the literature (Rios-Neto et al., 2018).
7.4 Standard Errors
The error terms in (2) are likely to be correlated between individuals. To account
for this intra-group correlation in our main analysis we cluster standard errors at the
regional level (States of the Brazilian Federation). As a robustness check we cluster
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standard errors at the level of regions and settlement types: Increasing the number
of clusters from 20 to 47 does not alter the results (Table A20).
As we exploit data covering a relatively long observation period, fertility rates may
suffer from autocorrelation. As illustrated by Bertrand et al. (2003), this can inflate
the incidence of Type-I error and lead to significant estimates even in the absence of
a true effect. To account for potential autocorrelation in fertility rates we reduce the
annual observations into one pre- and one post-treatment mean observation per group
and region. We then repeat our analysis with this ‘collapsed’ data set containing only
80 observations. Despite the drastically reduced estimation power, we still find highly
significant negative policy effects for older women and a weaker average effect for all
women (see Table A21, col. 6). The final specification (col. 6) remains marginally
insignificant at conventional levels. These findings based on only two time periods
suggests that autocorrelation is not a major threat to our analysis.
8 Conclusions
This study estimates the causal effect of expanding public old-age pensions on indi-
vidual fertility behavior. Exploiting the Brazilian pension reform of 1991 we find that
the associated increase in pension wealth has a significant negative effect on fertility:
The reform reduced the probability of childbirth by 10% in the short-run and com-
pleted fertility by about 1.3 within the first 20 years after the reform. The decrease
of the childbearing probability is fully concentrated among women in the middle and
late phases of their fertility cycle (aged 30-44), among women with more children and
among women who already have a son in the family; in fact, the effect is insignifi-
cantly different from zero for women below age 30. A number of robustness checks
and falsification exercises support the causal interpretation of the policy effects of the
Brazilian pension reform.
Our results lend micro evidence to the long established view that the introduction
of pension systems in emerging and developing countries is associated with declining
fertility rates at the macro level. The findings bolster the old-age security hypothesis
and confirm the credibility of negative correlations found in previous empirical studies
using aggregate data. Of course, a note of caution is warranted with respect to the
external validity: Our quasi-experiment in Brazil relies on an unusual equalization
of pension benefits between urban and rural areas. Still, many pension schemes in
emerging and developing countries disadvantage (or fully exclude) rural populations
similar to the system that underwent reform in Brazil in the early 1990s.
35
Our results are politically relevant in the light of population aging in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs). According to the United Nations (2017), the most
rapid demographic aging is projected to take place in LMICs: by 2050, 80% of the
world’s elderly (age 60+) will be living in those countries. Since most LMICs are
insufficiently prepared for the upcoming demographic change, they may experience
dramatic economic and social repercussions. While longer lives represent one of the
greatest benefits from economic development, governments and societies around the
globe have to consider how to provide for the growing number of old citizens. For
most countries, public old-age pension systems are a major pillar to grant citizens
economic security during retirement (Barr and Diamond, 2009; Holzmann and Hinz,
2009; Willmore, 2007). However, in LMICs these programs are often not generous,
exclusive, and complicated with respect to legal eligibility criteria. In particular, only
few of these programs cover the rural population and low-income or informal-sector
workers. Improving coverage and benefit levels of pension systems in LMICs is one
of the key challenges of the next decades given widespread old-age poverty (World
Bank, 2017). From our perspective it is essential that policymakers consider the
fertility effects of reforming public pensions, especially when declining fertility can
erode the basis of PAYG systems. Avoiding unintended demographic consequences of
reforms will make pension systems more sustainable in the long-run.
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Figure A1: Gross present pension wealth of Rural and Urban Male
Workers.
Note: Pre- and post-reform pension wealth is computed as the present value of expected old age
benefits before/after the reform adjusted for real interest rates and average survival probabili-
ties (computed using IBGE mortality tables; first time available in 1998): Pension Wealth =∑T−a
t=0 sa,t × 1(1+i)t × pensiont, with sa,t denoting the probability of a person of age a in a given
year surviving until year t; T − a, indicates the remaining maximum lifespan differentiated by sex
and birth cohort; i is a constant discount rate (12%); and pensiont denotes the old age pension
benefits in t. A non-retired person receives the pension starting in a future period t > 0, defined by
the person’s age and the regular retirement age. Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
42
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
S
ha
re
 o
f m
ar
rie
d 
w
om
en
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
 Rural  Urban
Marriage rates: Women aged 15-29
0
2
4
6
8
10
A
ve
ra
ge
 y
ea
rs
 o
f e
du
ca
tio
n
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
 Rural  Urban
Years of education: Women aged 15-29
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
un
de
r 
60
 m
on
th
s 
of
 a
ge
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
 Rural  Urban
Child mortality rates: Women aged 15-29
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
A
ve
ra
ge
 in
co
m
e 
sh
ar
e
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
 Rural  Urban
Woman's household income share: Women aged 15-29
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 w
om
en
 w
or
ki
ng
 d
ur
in
g 
re
f. 
w
ee
k
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
 Rural  Urban
Labor force participation rates: Women aged 15-29
25
30
35
40
45
H
ou
rs
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
 Rural  Urban
Weekly hours of work: Women aged 15-29
Figure A2: Confounding factor trends: Women aged 15-29
Note: Graphs show average marriage rates, years of education, child mortality rates, income of
women as a share of household income, labor force participation rates, and weekly hours of work
for rural and urban female workers. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray);
Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A3: Confounding factor trends: Women aged 30-44
Note: Graphs show average marriage rates, years of education, child mortality rates, income of
women as a share of household income, labor force participation rates, and weekly hours of work
for rural and urban female workers. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray);
Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A4: Educational Outcomes of Children - Years of Schooling,
Brazil 1981-99
Note: Graphs show average years of education of children living in households with female rural and
urban workers aged 15-44. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension
reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined by the parents occupation,
defined as in Table 2. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A5: Household Income (without Pensions) and household Wealth
index, Brazil 1981-99
Note: Left graphs show average household income (excl. retirement pensions) for rural and urban
worker households. Right graphs show average wealth index levels of rural and urban worker house-
holds. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform implemented
in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples
excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A6: Development of the indexed Tariff rates (1987=100): by ur-
ban and rural industrial sectors, Brazil 1987-1999
Note: Graph shows the indexed annual indexed tariff rates applicable for urban and rural industries
(1987=100). Tariff rates for the agricultural industry are assigned to rural, tariff rates of all other
manufacturing industries are assigned to urban. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988
(light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Source: De Paiva Abreu (2004).
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Figure A7: Full- and Part-Time Employment Shares, Brazil 1981-99
Note: Graphs show the share of women in 10-hour brackets of working hours for female rural and
urban workers. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform
implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Source: PNAD
1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A8: Religious Affiliations, Brazil 1980, 1991, 2000
Note: Sample consists of the Brazilian population aged 15-44 participating in the Census. Rural and
urban groups defined by household location. Source: Brazilian Census 1980, 1991, 2000.
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Figure A9: Importance of religion in life and confidence in church,
Brazil 1991, 1997
Note: Sample consists of the Brazilian population aged 15-44 participating in the World Values
Survey. Rural and urban groups defined by household location (for the WVS we approximate this
by the size of the town: smaller or larger than 10.000 inhabitants). Source: WVS 1991, 1997.
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Figure A10: Childlessness: Differences in the share of childless women
at the age of 45
Note: Left graph shows the share of childless women at age 45. Right graph shows ES estimates of
the pension reform for the share of childless women at age 45 before and after the reform. Dependent
variable: Dummy equal to one if a woman never gave birth to a child (alive or dead). 90% confidence
interval based on standard errors clustered at the regional (federal state) level. Vertical lines: new
Constitution approved in 1988 (light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and
urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1984-85,
1992-93, 1995-99, 2001-09, 2011-14.
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Figure A11: Birth Probabilities by Older Children’s Gender: Women
aged 15-29 vs. Women aged 30-44
Note: Graphs show 3-year moving averages (2-years at the edges: 1981-82, 1989-90, 1992-93 and 1998-
99) of birth probabilities, i.e., average childbearing (0/1) rates within the last 12 months, conditional
on whether women already gave birth to at least one boy, at least two boys, had only girls born before
or had no children before. Left graphs for women aged 15-29, right graphs for women aged 30-44.
Counterfactual trend as of 1987: gray dashed line. Vertical lines: new Constitution approved in 1988
(light-gray); Pension reform implemented in 1991 (black). Rural and urban groups are defined as in
Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A12: DiD Regression Results: Women by Age
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform for 2-year age groups of women aged 15-44. Dependent
variable: Dummy, whether a child was born in the last 12 months. Full set of covariates, as in
Table 3, column 6. Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples
excluded. 90% confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the regional (federal state)
level. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A13: Age of mothers at birth, density plots
Note: Graphs show age of mothers at birth, rural and urban, for 1985 and 1995. Sample consists of
Brazilian females aged 10-55. Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural
couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Figure A14: Highest Educational Attainment, Brazil 1981-99
Note: Graphs show shares of female rural (R) and urban (U) workers primary, secondary or tertiary
educational attainments. Rural and urban groups are defined as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural
couples excluded. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A7: Sensitivity Analysis - Women Outside Age Range Excluded:
Pooled (Women aged 15-44) and Subgroups (15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID women aged 15-44 -0.008** -0.007** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
N : 15-44 (1,325,397); 15-29 (780,431); 30-44 (544,966)
R2 15-44: 0.006 0.008 0.108 0.113 0.119 0.119
R2 15-29: 0.004 0.006 0.148 0.156 0.160 0.161
R2 30-44: 0.011 0.015 0.047 0.051 0.057 0.058
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses,
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A8: Sensitivity Analysis - Mixed Occupation Couples: Pooled
(Women aged 15-44) and Subgroups (15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Women from mixed occupation couples included,
dummy for mixed couple
DID women aged 15-44 -0.008** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.007* 0.008** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N : 15-44 (1,429,160); 15-29 (844,420); 30-44 (584,740)
R2: 15-44 0.006 0.008 0.104 0.109 0.115 0.116
R2: 15-29 0.004 0.005 0.150 0.158 0.162 0.163
R2: 30-44 0.011 0.016 0.058 0.061 0.067 0.069
Panel B: Women from mixed occupation couples included
no dummy for mixed couple
DID women aged 15-44 -0.007** -0.006** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.007** 0.008** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.024***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N : 15-44 (1,429,160); 15-29 (844,420); 30-44 (584,740)
R2 15-44: 0.006 0.008 0.104 0.109 0.115 0.116
R2 15-29: 0.004 0.005 0.150 0.158 0.162 0.163
R2 30-44: 0.011 0.016 0.057 0.061 0.067 0.069
Controls in Panel A and Panel B:
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2.
Panel A: Dummy for mixed couple=1 if occupation of the woman is not equal the occupation of
her partner, 0 otherwise; Panel B: Mixed couples included according to the woman’s occupation.
Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A9: Sensitivity Analysis - Rural and Urban Group Definition:
Pooled (Women Aged 15-44) and Subgroups (Women aged 15-
29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Defined by household location
DID women aged 15-44 -0.010*** -0.001*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N : 15-44 (1,429,160); 15-29 (844,420); 30-44 (584,740)
R2 15-44: 0.006 0.008 0.104 0.110 0.116 0.116
R2 15-29: 0.004 0.005 0.150 0.158 0.163 0.163
R2 30-44: 0.011 0.016 0.057 0.062 0.068 0.069
Panel B: Defined by personal occupational information and household location
DID women aged 15-44 -0.009** -0.008** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
DID women aged 15-29 0.006 0.007* 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
N : 15-44 (1,289,689); 15-29 (757,592); 30-44 (532,097)
R2 15-44: 0.006 0.008 0.102 0.108 0.114 0.114
R2 15-29: 0.004 0.006 0.146 0.155 0.160 0.160
R2 30-44: 0.011 0.015 0.056 0.061 0.067 0.067
Controls in Panel A and Panel B:
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2. Panel
A: Rural and urban group definition by household location; Panel B: Rural and urban group definition
by personal occupational information and household location (not using occupational information of
the household head). Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional
level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A10: Results of the DiD Regression Analysis - Alternative Specifi-
cations: Pooled (Women Aged 15-44) and Subgroups (Women
aged 15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DID women aged 15-44 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.0001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Year and region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional/group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other indicators for Yes No Yes No No No Noeducational achievements
Household retirement No Yes No Yes No No Noincome share
Income variables No No Yes No No No Noon family basis
Dummies working unpaid No No No Yes No No Noor in public sector
Squared terms No No No No Yes No No
Linear Age and No No No Yes No Yes Noage partner
Age and age No No No Yes No No Yespartner dummies
N : 15-44 (1,326,819); 15-29 (780,682); 30-44 (546,137)
R2 15-44: 0.116 0.115 0.118 0.115 0.117 0.114 0.121
R2 15-29: 0.162 0.162 0.165 0.161 0.163 0.159 0.162
R2 30-44: 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.069 0.055 0.059
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Individual, job, household and region/group level covariates as in Table 3.
Other indicators for educational achievements are a dummy indicating the ability to read and write
and three dummies indicating highest educational stage (primary, secondary, college/university; has
not attended any school dummy omitted) attended/attending. Income variables on family basis
are log of family income and share of family income earned by the woman (both excl. pensions)
for the nuclear family, i.e., only the woman, her partner and own children. Additional squared
terms are years of schooling, log of household income (excl. pensions), share of household income
(excl. pensions) earned by the woman and household wealth. Rural and urban group definition as
in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in
parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A11: Test of the Common Trend: Pooled (Women aged 15-44) and
Subgroups (Women aged 15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dep. Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3)
Period Women aged 15-44 Women aged 15-29 Women aged 30-44
1981 0.001 -0.003 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
1982 0.006 0.001 0.017*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
1983 0.007 0.008 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
1984 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
1985 0.009 0.008 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
1986 0.003 -0.000 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
1988 -0.001 0.002 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
1989 0.000 0.007 -0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
1990 0.005 0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
1992 -0.003 -0.000 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
1993 -0.004 0.007 -0.016**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
1995 -0.001 0.012* -0.012**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
1996 -0.012* -0.000 -0.021**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
1997 -0.010 0.005 -0.024***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
1998 -0.010 0.002 -0.019**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
1999 -0.020*** -0.005 -0.033***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Year and region FE Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note) Yes Yes Yes
N : 1,326,819 780,682 546,137
R2: 0.115 0.161 0.068
Note: Year-specific treatment effects for the full sample and by age groups 15-29 and 30-44. Depen-
dent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born in the last 12 months. Full set of covariates, as in Ta-
ble 3, column 6. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded.
Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A12: Desired Number of Children, by urban/rural and age groups
All women
1986 1996 Change
Age groups Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-44 2.70 3.10 2.19 2.50 -0.51 -0.60
15-29 2.50 2.83 2.02 2.25 -0.47 -0.58
30-44 3.00 3.50 2.40 2.81 -0.60 -0.69
Women with at least one child
1986 1996 Change
Age groups Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-44 2.86 3.29 2.31 2.66 -0.55 -0.63
15-29 2.53 2.95 2.02 2.32 -0.51 -0.63
30-44 3.09 3.57 2.48 2.89 -0.61 -0.68
Women with number of children<children desired
1986 1996 Change
Age groups Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-44 2.93 3.42 2.51 2.76 -0.42 -0.66
15-29 2.68 3.10 2.25 2.49 -0.43 -0.61
30-44 3.70 4.73 3.27 3.70 -0.43 -1.03
Note: Sample consists of Brazilian females aged 15-44. Rural and urban groups are defined by
household location. The corresponding DHS questionnaire from which we derive the numbers ask
for the ideal number of children is the number of children the respondent would have liked to have
in her whole life, irrespective of the number she already has. Source: DHS 1986, 1996.
Table A13: Contraceptive Methods, by urban/rural and age groups
Panel A: Modern Methods
All women
1986 1996 Change Change in %
Age groups Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-44 0.395 0.308 0.512 0.441 0.117 0.134 29.7 43.4
15-29 0.395 0.307 0.508 0.438 0.114 0.131 28.8 42.8
30-44 0.396 0.309 0.517 0.445 0.122 0.136 30.8 44.1
Panel B: Traditional Methods
All women
1986 1996 Change Change in %
Age groups Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-44 0.060 0.077 0.039 0.057 -0.021 -0.020 -34.8 -26.7
15-29 0.060 0.076 0.039 0.056 -0.021 -0.020 -35.1 -26.6
30-44 0.061 0.079 0.040 0.057 -0.020 -0.022 -34.4 -27.1
Note: Numbers show the shares of current contraceptive methods used by women. Pregnant women
are coded as not currently using. Classification of contraceptive methods according to DHS definition:
Modern methods are Pill, IUD, Injections, Diaphragm/Foam/Jelly, Condom, Female Sterilization,
Male Sterilization and Norplant. Traditional methods are Periodic Abstinence (Rhythm), With-
drawal, Abstinence, and any other country specific methods. Rural and urban groups are defined by
household location. Source: DHS 1986, 1996.
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Table A14: DiD Regression Results - Covariates: Pooled (Women Aged
15-44) and Subgroups (Women aged 15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3)
Women aged 15-44 Women aged 15-29 Women aged 30-44
DID estimator -0.012*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) -0.024*** (0.004)
Years of education -0.001** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 0.001* (0.000)
Dummy married 0.140*** (0.006) 0.164*** (0.007) 0.048*** (0.003)
Age of the woman 0.002 (0.001) 0.043*** (0.003) -0.048*** (0.003)
Age of the woman squared -0.000*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Dummy birth-parity 1 -0.075*** (0.004) -0.096*** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.002)
Dummy birth-parity 2 -0.128*** (0.004) -0.144*** (0.005) -0.046*** (0.003)
Dummy birth-parity 3 -0.143*** (0.004) -0.151*** (0.005) -0.052*** (0.003)
Dummy birth-parity 4 -0.140*** (0.003) -0.150*** (0.005) -0.037*** (0.003)
Dummy birth-parity 5+ -0.139*** (0.003) -0.163*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.005)
Dummy 1-10 hours of work -0.033*** (0.003) -0.039*** (0.005) -0.027*** (0.002)
Dummy 11-20 hours of work -0.034*** (0.002) -0.040*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.002)
Dummy 21-30 hours of work -0.037*** (0.002) -0.044*** (0.002) -0.031*** (0.002)
Dummy 31-40 hours of work -0.042*** (0.002) -0.056*** (0.002) -0.032*** (0.002)
Dummy 41-50 hours of work -0.050*** (0.002) -0.065*** (0.002) -0.039*** (0.002)
Dummy 51-60 hours of work -0.059*** (0.002) -0.076*** (0.003) -0.042*** (0.002)
Dummy 60+ hours of work -0.062*** (0.003) -0.082*** (0.004) -0.039*** (0.002)
Household income share of the woman 0.005* (0.003) -0.014** (0.006) 0.014*** (0.001)
Dummy caretaker -0.000 (0.002) -0.015*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Log of household income excl. pensions -0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Wealth index -0.020*** (0.003) -0.021*** (0.003) -0.013*** (0.002)
Age of woman’s partner 0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.000)
Age of woman’s partner squared -0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Dummy Globo coverage 0.004 (0.009) 0.009 (0.007) -0.011 (0.011)
Protestants share -0.183*** (0.059) -0.105 (0.061) -0.245*** (0.061)
Other religions share -0.632*** (0.167) -0.609*** (0.168) -0.475** (0.186)
No religion share 0.037 (0.082) -0.052 (0.080) 0.169* (0.089)
Race share black 0.091 (0.159) 0.115 (0.146) -0.083 (0.167)
Race share mixed 0.130** (0.056) 0.123** (0.050) 0.098 (0.061)
Race share other -0.222 (0.154) -0.235 (0.155) -0.270 (0.175)
Under 5 years mortality rate 0.188* (0.107) 0.120 (0.104) 0.320*** (0.107)
Year and region FE Yes Yes Yes
Other Covariates (see note) Yes Yes Yes
N : 1,326,819 780,682 546,137
R2: 0.115 0.161 0.068
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3, explained in detail in Appendix A1-A8. Other
household covariates: dummies for the number of adults in the household. Other regional/group
covariates: regional industry specific trade shocks (variable based on methodology of Dix-Carneiro
and Kovak (2017) and annual tariff reduction data taken from De Paiva Abreu (2004)). Rural and
urban group definition as in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered
at the regional level in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90,
1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A15: DiD Regression Results: Subgroups (5-Year Age Cohorts)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID women aged 15-19 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
in % to baseline 4.0 4.9 0.9 1.5 1.6 -0.6
DID women aged 20-24 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
in % to baseline 3.3 3.9 2.7 2.2 2.9 2.6
DID women aged 25-29 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012* -0.011* -0.001 -0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
in % to baseline -6.7 -6.5 -6.9 -6.5 -5.6 -6.1
DID women aged 30-34 -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
in % to baseline -26.2 -26.0 -24.1 -23.3 -22.7 -22.6
DID women aged 35-39 -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
in % to baseline -31.1 -30.2 -27.6 -26.3 -25.0 -24.2
DID women aged 40-44 -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
in % to baseline -37.3 -37.5 -36.6 -35.9 -34.6 -33.2
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
N : 15-19 (289,695), 20-24 (257,998), 25-29 (232,989),
30-34 (209,944), 35-39 (181,595), 40-44 (154,598)
R2 15-19: 0.008 0.004 0.246 0.252 0.256 0.256
R2 20-24: 0.009 0.013 0.148 0.158 0.164 0.164
R2 25-29: 0.008 0.012 0.072 0.081 0.086 0.087
R2 30-34: 0.011 0.015 0.047 0.053 0.060 0.061
R2 35-39: 0.014 0.019 0.035 0.038 0.045 0.047
R2 40-44: 0.015 0.020 0.115 0.116 0.121 0.122
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses,
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A16: Other Specifications - Time trends and region-time trends:
Pooled (Women Aged 15-44) and Subgroups (Women aged 15-
29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Time-trend
DID women aged 15-44 -0.009** -0.008** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.027***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N : 15-44 (1,326,819); 15-29 (780,682); 30-44 (546,137)
R2: 15-44 0.007 0.009 0.078 0.082 0.083 0.088
R2: 15-29 0.004 0.006 0.123 0.125 0.125 0.133
R2: 30-44 0.013 0.016 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.063
Panel B: Region-Time-Trend
DID women aged 15-44 -0.008** -0.007* -0.006*** -0.006** -0.009** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
N : 15-44 (1,326,819); 15-29 (780,682); 30-44 (546,137)
R2 15-44: 0.008 0.009 0.079 0.082 0.083 0.088
R2 15-29: 0.006 0.006 0.123 0.125 0.125 0.133
R2 30-44: 0.015 0.017 0.044 0.047 0.047 0.063
Panel A: Time trend
Panel B: Region-Time trend
Controls in Panel A and Panel B:
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses,
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A17: Sensitivity Analysis - Censit Areas: Pooled (Women aged 15-
44) and Subgroups (15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Only Not Self-Representative Censit Areas
DID women aged 15-44 -0.007** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DID women aged 15-29 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
N : 15-44 (469,375); 15-29 (280,560); 30-44 (188,815)
R2: 15-44 0.007 0.010 0.106 0.110 0.116 0.117
R2: 15-29 0.003 0.006 0.156 0.161 0.165 0.165
R2: 30-44 0.016 0.025 0.066 0.069 0.076 0.077
Panel B: Only Self-Representative Censit Areas
DID women aged 15-44 -0.016* -0.014* -0.015* -0.013 -0.010 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
DID women aged 15-29 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.025***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
N : 15-44 (233,898); 15-29 (138,093); 30-44 (95,805)
R2: 15-44 0.004 0.005 0.104 0.110 0.117 0.116
R2: 15-29 0.002 0.003 0.142 0.151 0.155 0.156
R2: 30-44 0.006 0.009 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.063
Panel C: Only Metropolitan Censit Areas
DID women aged 15-44 -0.013** -0.012* -0.009 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
DID women aged 15-29 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.015 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.038** -0.037** -0.034** -0.034** -0.030** -0.033**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
N : 15-44 (15-44 (623,546); 15-29 (362,029); 30-44 (261,517)
R2 15-44: 0.002 0.005 0.098 0.104 0.111 0.111
R2 15-29: 0.001 0.003 0.142 0.152 0.158 0.159
R2 30-44: 0.003 0.007 0.049 0.053 0.059 0.060
Controls in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C:
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses,
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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Table A18: Sensitivity Analysis - Region-Censit Area Cluster Variable:
Pooled (Women aged 15-44) and Subgroups (15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID women aged 15-44 -0.008** -0.008** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DID women aged 15-29 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
N : 15-44 (1,326,819); 15-29 (780,682); 30-44 (546,137)
R2 15-44: 0.006 0.009 0.103 0.108 0.114 0.115
R2 15-29: 0.004 0.006 0.148 0.156 0.161 0.161
R2 30-44: 0.011 0.016 0.057 0.061 0.067 0.068
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a child was born
in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as in Table 2.
Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the level of censit areas by regions
in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
Table A19: Sensitivity Analysis - Two-period model: Pooled (Women aged
15-44) and Subgroups (15-29 vs. 30-44)
Dependent Variable Newborn child under 1 year old (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID women aged 15-44 -0.007** -0.007* -0.010* -0.003 -0.010 -0.053
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.043)
DID women aged 15-29 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.017
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.049)
DID women aged 30-44 -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.047*** -0.032* -0.042*** -0.087***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.027)
Year and region FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates (see note):
Individual No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job No No No Yes Yes Yes
Household No No No No Yes Yes
Regional/Group No No No No No Yes
N : 15-44 (80), 15-29 (80), 30-44 (80)
R2 15-44: 0.722 0.907 0.945 0.963 0.975 0.992
R2 15-29: 0.641 0.871 0.921 0.941 0.951 0.973
R2 30-44: 0.649 0.861 0.914 0.938 0.968 0.997
Note: DID estimates of the pension reform in a two-period model: all variables are pre- and post
reform averages by region and rural and urban occupation. Dependent variable: Dummy, whether a
child was born in the last 12 months. Covariates as in Table 3. Rural and urban group definition as
in Table 2. Mixed urban-rural couples excluded. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in
parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1. Source: PNAD 1981-90, 1992-93, 1995-99.
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